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Abstract
Caching is an efficient way to reduce network traffic congestion during peak hours by storing some
content at the user’s local cache memory without knowledge of later demands. For the shared-link
caching model, Maddah-Ali and Niesen (MAN) proposed a two-phase (placement and delivery) coded
caching strategy, which is order optimal within a constant factor. However, in the MAN coded caching
scheme, each user can obtain the information about the demands of other users, i.e., the MAN coded
caching scheme is inherently prone to tampering and spying the activity/demands of other users. In this
paper, we formulate an information-theoretic shared-link caching model with private demands, where
there are K cache-aided users (which can cache up to M files) connected to a central server with access
to N files. Each user requests L files. Our objective is to design a two-phase private caching scheme
with minimum load while preserving the information-theoretic privacy of the demands of each user with
respect to other users.
A trivial solution is the uncoded caching scheme which lets each user recover all the N files,
referred to as baseline scheme. For this problem we propose two novel schemes which achieve the
information-theoretic privacy of the users’ demands while also achieving a non-trivial caching gain over
the baseline scheme. The general underlying idea is to satisfy the users’ requests by generating a set
of coded multicast messages that is symmetric with respect to the library files, such that for each user
k, the mutual information between these messages and the demands of all other users given the cache
content and the demand of user k is zero. In the first scheme, referred to as virtual-user scheme, we
introduce a number of virtual users such that each L-subset of files is demanded by K real or virtual
(effective) users and use the MAN delivery to generate multicast messages. From the viewpoint of each
user, the set of multicast messages is symmetric over all files even if each single multicast message is
not. This scheme incurs in an extremely large sub-packetization. Then, we propose a second scheme,
referred to as MDS-based scheme, based on a novel MDS-coded cache placement. In this case, we
generate multicast messages where each multicast message contains one MDS-coded symbol from each
file in the library and thus is again symmetric over all the files from the viewpoint of each user. The
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2sub-packetization level of the MDS-based scheme is exponentially smaller than that needed by the
virtual-user scheme.
Compared with the existing shared-link coded caching converse bounds without privacy, the virtual-
user scheme is proved to be order optimal with a constant factor when N ≤ LK, or when N ≥ LK and
M ≥ N/K. In addition, when M ≥ N/2, both of the virtual-user scheme and the MDS-based scheme
are order optimal within a factor of 2.
Index Terms
Coded caching, information-theoretic privacy, virtual users, MDS code.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Brief Review of Coded Caching
Recent years have witnessed a steep increase of wireless devices connected to the Internet,
leading to a heavy network traffic because of multimedia streaming, web-browsing and social
networking. Furthermore, the high temporal variability of network traffic results in congestions
during peak-traffic times and underutilization of the network during off-peak times. Caching
is a promising technique to reduce peak traffic by taking advantage of memories distributed
across the network to duplicate content during off-peak times [1] . With the help of caching,
network traffic could be shifted from peak to off-peak hours in order to smooth out the traffic
load and reduce congestion. In the seminal paper [2], an information-theoretic and network-
coding theoretic model for caching was proposed. In this model, two phases are included in a
caching system: i) placement phase: each user equipped with cache stores some bits in its cache
component without knowledge of later demands; ii) delivery phase: after each user has made
its request and according to cache contents, the server transmits packets such that each user can
recover its desired file(s). The goal is to minimize the number of transmitted bits (referred to as
load in this paper).
Coded caching strategy was originally proposed in [2] for the shared-link broadcast networks
where a server with a library of N files, of B bits each, is connected to K users (each of which is
with a cache of MB bits) through a shared error-free broadcast link. Each user requests one file
independently in the delivery phase. Maddah-Ali and Niesen (MAN) proposed a coded caching
scheme that utilizes an uncoded combinatorial cache construction in the placement phase and a
binary linear network code to generate multicast messages in the delivery phase. For M = tN
K
with
3t ∈ [0 : K], the transmitted load is K(1−M/N)
1+KM/N
. For other memory size, the lower convex envelope
of the above memory-load tradeoff points is achievable by memory-sharing between schemes for
integer values of t = KM/N. Compared to the conventional uncoded caching scheme which lets
each user store MB/N bits of each file in the placement phase and broadcasts the uncached part
of each desired file during the delivery phase with the transmitted load K(1−M/N), the MAN
coded caching scheme has an additional coded caching gain (i.e., load reduction factor) equal to
1 + KM/N. It was proved in [3] that the worst-case load achieved by the MAN coded caching
scheme among all possible demands is optimal under the constraint of uncoded placement (i.e.,
each user directly stores a subset of bits in the library) and N ≥ K. When N ≥ K, the MAN
coded caching scheme was also proved in [4] to be generally order optimal within a factor of
2. For any N and K, a factor of 4 for the order optimality of the MAN coded caching scheme
was proved in [5]. By observing that some MAN multicast messages are redundant for the case
N < K, the authors in [6] proposed an improved delivery scheme which is optimal under the
constraint of uncoded cache placement for any N and K, and optimal within a factor of 2 over
all possible placement strategies.
In the MAN caching model, each user requests only one file, which may not be practical. The
caching problem with multi-request was originally considered in [7] where each user demands
L files from the library. With the MAN placement, to divide the delivery phase into L rounds
where in each round the MAN coded caching scheme in [2] (referred to as L-round MAN coded
caching scheme in this paper, which reduces to the MAN coded caching scheme when L = 1)
is used to let each user decode one file, can achieve a generally order optimal worst-case load
within a factor of 18 [7]. By further tightening the converse bound, this order optimality factor
was reduced to 11 in [8].
The MAN coded caching strategy was also used in a number of extended models, such
as decentralized caching where users must fill their caches independently of other users [9],
device-to-device (D2D) caching systems where users communicate among each other during the
delivery phase [10], cache-aided topological networks where the server communicates with the
users through some intermediate relays [11]–[13], etc. However, these extended models will not
be considered in our paper, and thus we do not go into details.
4B. Existing Secure Coded Caching Schemes
Soon after the appearance of [2], various ‘secure’ versions of the caching problem have
been proposed. Secure coded caching was originally considered in [14], where there are some
wiretappers who can also receive the broadcasted packets from the server. To prevent the
wiretappers from obtaining any information about the files in the library, the authors in [14]
let each user store not only the content about the library in its cache, but also some ‘keys’. In
the delivery phase, each multicast message is generated by taking XOR of the MAN multicast
message and some key in order to ‘lock’ the multicast messages such that only the intended users
can unlock it. This secure caching scheme against wiretappers was proved in [15] to be optimal
under the constraint of uncoded cache placement. Another secure shared-link caching model was
proposed in [16]. In this case, the objective is to avoid each user to get any information about
the files not required by that user. The placement and delivery phases were designed based on
the MAN coded caching scheme with an additional secret sharing precoding [17] on each file
(i.e., by encoding a message with (n, t) secret sharing code where n > t, any t shares do not
reveal any information about the message and the message can be reconstructed from all the n
shares). In addition, the secure caching scheme in [16] could also successfully prevent external
wiretappers, because each multicast message is also locked by a key. The above strategies to
prevent external wiretappers and internal malicious users from retrieving information about the
library, were then used in extended models, such as D2D caching systems [18], [19], topological
cache-aided relay networks [20], erasure broadcast channels [21], etc.
C. Coded Caching with Private Demands
The existing secure caching schemes are based on the MAN coded caching scheme (with or
without a secure precoding on each file) and then generate locked MAN multicast messages.
However, a malicious user could simply use the MAN multicast messages (or locked MAN
multicast messages) in order to learn the requests of other users, e.g., to perform some survey
on user preferences, which is not good in terms of privacy. Shared-link caching problem with
single request to preserve the users demands from other users was originally considered in [22].
The caching scheme proposed in [22] generates ` virtual users each of which randomly demands
one file, such that each user cannot match the exact request to any other user. However, this
caching scheme is not completely private from an information-theoretic viewpoint. For example,
if there exists undemanded file by any real or virtual user, each user will know this file has
5not been demanded such that it can get some information about the users demands from the
transmission. In this paper, we formulate an information-theoretic caching problem which aims
to preserve the privacy of the demands of each user with respect to other users during the
transmission.
Let us focus on a toy example with K = 2, N = 3 and M = 2N/3 = 2. In this example,
t = KM/N = 4/3, which is not an integer, and thus we should use the memory-sharing between
M1 = Nt1/K = 3/2 with t1 = 1 and M2 = Nt2/K = 3 with t2 = 2. By the MAN placement,
we divide each file into three equal-length and non-overlapping subfiles, the ith file, denoted by
Fi, has three subfiles Fi,{1}, Fi,{2}, and Fi,{1,2}. User 1 caches Fi,{1} and Fi,{1,2}, while user 2
caches Fi,{2} and Fi,{1,2}.
In the delivery phase, we consider two demands:
• if the demand is (1, 2), i.e., user 1 demands file F1 and user 2 demands file F2, we transmit
the MAN multicast message F1,{2}⊕F2,{1}, where ⊕ represents the XOR operation, such that
user 1 can recover F1,{2} and user 2 can recover F2,{1}. However, for the sake of successful
decoding, user 1 needs to know that F2,{1} is contained by the multicast message, and thus
it knows user 2 demands F2. Similarly, user 2 will know the demand of user 1.
• if the demand is (1, 1), i.e., both users 1 and 2 demand file F1, we transmit the MAN
multicast message F1,{2}⊕F1,{1}, such that user 1 can recover F1,{2} and user 2 can recover
F1,{1}. However, from the transmission, user 1 knows user 2 demands F1, while user 2
knows the demand of user 1.
The above example shows that the MAN scheme is inherently prone to tampering and spying
the activity/demands of other users. In this paper we develop schemes that are able to provide full
information-theoretic privacy of the users’ demands, while still providing a non-trivial caching
gain. To motivate the reader and show that this is indeed possible, we continue our toy example
with the following scheme, which is a special case of the MDS-based scheme in Theorem 4.
In the placement phase, we encode each file Fi by a (4, 3) MDS code (i.e., each file Fi is split
into 3 blocks of B/3 bits each, which are then encoded by a (4, 3) MDS code such that each
of the four MDS coded symbols has B/3 bits). Each file can be reconstructed by any three
MDS coded symbols. The four MDS coded symbols are denoted by Si1, S
i
2, S
i
3, S
i
4. We randomly
generate a permutation of {1, 2, 3, 4}, denoted by pi = (pi,1, pi,2, pi,3, pi,4) and let Fi,∅ = Sipi,1 ,
Fi,{1} = Sipi,2 , Fi,{2} = S
i
pi,3
, and Fi,{1,2} = Sipi,4 . We let user 1 cache Fi,{1} and Fi,{1,2}, and
user 2 cache Fi,{2} and Fi,{1,2}. Notice that, for the sake of successful decoding, user 1 knows
6the compositions of Fi,{1} and Fi,{1,2} (i.e., it knows from which code on which bits Fi,{1} and
Fi,{1,2} are generated), but it does not know pi, i.e., it does not know which one of Fi,{1} and
Fi,{1,2} is cached by user 2. Hence, Fi,{1} and Fi,{1,2} are equivalent from the viewpoint of user
1. Similarly, Fi,{2} and Fi,∅ are also equivalent from the viewpoint of user 1.
In the delivery phase, we also consider two demands:
• if the demand is (1, 2), we transmit F1,{2} ⊕ F2,{1} ⊕ F3,{1,2}, such that user 1 can recover
F1,{2} and user 2 can recover F2,{1}. Notice that each user only knows the composition of
each MDS coded symbol in the sum, without knowing whether the other user caches it or
not. From the viewpoint of user 1, in the sum there is one MDS coded symbol from each
file and among these MDS coded symbols it caches the ones from the non-demanded files
(i.e., F2 and F3).
• if the demand is (1, 1), we transmit F1,∅ ⊕ F2,{1,2} ⊕ F3,{1,2}, such that users 1 and 2 can
recover F1,∅. Again, from the viewpoint of user 1, in the sum there is one MDS coded
symbol from each file and among these MDS coded symbols, it caches the ones from the
non-demanded files.
For the above two demands, from the viewpoint of user 1, the delivery phases are equivalent.
Hence, user 1 cannot know any information about the request of user 2. A symmetric situation
holds for user 2 and for all other possible demands.
In practice, it may be important to preserve the privacy of the users demands. The above
example motivates the following question: what is the fundamental coded caching gain subject
to such strict privacy constraint on the users demands? In this paper, we focus on the private
shared-link caching model with multiple requests from an information-theoretic viewpoint, where
each user requests L files. The objective is to design a private caching scheme with minimum
load in the delivery phase, in order to maintain the successful decoding for each user and also
to prevent each user from getting any information about other users’ demands.
D. Relation to Private Information Retrieval
The privacy of the users demands was originally considered as the Private Information Retrieval
(PIR) problem in [23]. In this setting, a user wants to retrieve a desired message from some
distributed non-colluding databases (servers), and the objective is to prevent any server from
retrieving any information about the users’ demand. Recently, the authors in [24] characterized
7the information-theoretic capacity of the PIR problem by proposing a novel converse bound and
a coded PIR scheme based on an interference alignment idea.
Later, models combining the PIR problem with some caching component were proposed
in [25]–[30]. In [25], the user randomly caches some files in the library and its side information
is unknown to the servers. The capacity region of the rate in terms of the number of cached files
was characterized in [25]. The authors extended the model in [25] to the single-server multi-
user case, where each user caches some files and knows the demands of other users. A caching
scheme based on Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) code was proposed. In [27]–[29], for the
single-user PIR problem with end-user-cache, instead of caching the whole files, the user can
choose any bits to store as in the coded caching model. Novel converse and achievable bounds
were proposed in [27]–[29] for the cases where the user’s cache is known, partially known,
and unknown to the servers, respectively. The authors in [30] considered the single-user PIR
problem with end-database-caches, where each server can choose any bits to store instead of
being able to access to the whole library. Under the constraint of uncoded cache placement, the
optimal PIR scheme was given in [30]. The PIR problem was then generalized to the Private
Computation (PC) problem in [31], where the user should compute a function on the library
instead of directly retrieving one message.
The considered coded caching problem with private demands aims to preserve the privacy of
the demands of each user from other users, while the cache-aided PIR (or PC) problems aim to
preserve the privacy of the users demands from the databases. Hence, the main challenge of the
considered problem is to design multicast messages transmitted from the server such that each
user can decode its desired files without getting any information of other users’ demands, while
still achieving a non-trivial coded caching gain.
E. Contributions
Our main contributions are as follows.
• Problem formulation. We formulate an information-theoretic shared-link coded caching
model with multiple requests, and the constraints on the information-theoretic privacy of
the users demands from other users.
• Private coded caching schemes. With a novel idea of private placement precoding (which
makes the cached (resp. uncached) bits from each file equivalent from the viewpoint of each
user), we then propose two private coded caching schemes with two different strategies to
8generate a set of coded multicast messages which is symmetric over all the files (i.e.,
independent of the users’ demands) from the viewpoint of each user.
1) Inspired by the virtual-user strategy originally introduced in [22], we propose a novel
private caching scheme, referred to as virtual user scheme, by generating
(
N
L
)
K − K
virtual users such that each L-subset of files is demanded by exactly K real or virtual
(effective) users. We then propose a private delivery scheme based on the
(
N
L
)
K-user
MAN delivery scheme. Thus by ‘hiding’ the real users among all effective users, the
set of coded multicast messages is symmetric over all the files and independent of
the users’ demands, from the viewpoint of each user. Notice that the caching scheme
in [22] generates an arbitrary number of virtual users each of whom randomly demands
one file, which cannot guarantee the information-theoretic privacy constraint even if
the number of virtual users goes to infinity.
2) The main limitation of the virtual-user scheme is its sub-packetization level, which is
equal to the sub-packetization level of the
(
N
L
)
K-user MAN coded caching scheme (it
has the order O
(
2(
N
L)K
)
when M ≈ N/2). In order to reduce the sub-packetization
level, we propose the second scheme, referred to as MDS-based scheme. With a novel
MDS-based cache placement, the main strategy is to generate multicast messages in
the delivery phase, such that each multicast message contains one MDS-coded symbol
from each file and thus is symmetric over all the N files from the viewpoint of each
user. There is no MDS-coded symbol appearing in two multicast messages, which
makes the set of all multicast messages also symmetric over all the N files. The
needed sub-packetization level is O (2K), which reduces exponentially the one of the
virtual-user scheme and is the same as the maximal sub-packetization level of the
K-user MAN coded caching scheme.
• Order optimality results. We summarize the order optimality results of the two proposed
schemes in Table I. In short, the virtual-user scheme is order optimal within a constant
factor when N ≤ LK, or when N ≥ LK and M ≥ N/K. In addition, when M ≥ N/2, the
virtual-user scheme and the MDS-based scheme have the same order optimality results.
F. Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II formulates the considered shared-link
caching model with private demands. Section III lists all the results in this paper and provide
9Table I: Order optimality factors of the virtual-user scheme and the MDS-based scheme.
N > LK, M < N/2 N ≤ LK,M < N/2
M ≥ N/2
L = 1 L > 1 L = 1 L > 1
Virtual-user scheme 4, for N
K
≤ M < N
2
22, for N
K
≤ M < N
2
8 22 2
MDS-based scheme 2
some numerical evaluations. Section IV presents the proposed private caching schemes. Section V
concludes the paper and some proofs are given in the Appendices.
G. Notation Convention
Calligraphic symbols denote sets, bold symbols denote vectors, and sans-serif symbols denote
system parameters. We use | · | to represent the cardinality of a set or the length of a vector;
[a : b] := {a, a+ 1, . . . , b} and [n] := [1, 2, . . . , n]; ⊕ represents bit-wise XOR; E[·] represents
the expectation value of a random variable; [a]+ := max{a, 0}; we let (x
y
)
= 0 if x < 0 or y < 0
or x < y; we denote the power set of [a] by Pow(a), and sort all sets in lexicographic order.
Pow(a, j) denotes the j th set. For example,
Pow(3) = {∅, {1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 3}, {2}, {2, 3}, {3}},
and Pow(3, 1) = ∅, Pow(3, 2) = {1}, etc.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND RELATED RESULTS
A. System Model
A (K,N,M, L) shared-link caching system with private demands is defined as follows. The sys-
tem contains a server with access to a library of N independent files, denoted by (F1, F2, . . . , FN),
where each file is composed of B i.i.d. bits. As in [2], we assume that B is sufficiently large such
that any sub-packetization of the files is possible. The server is connected to K users through an
error-free shared-link. The caching system operates in two phases.
Placement Phase. During the placement phase, user k ∈ [K] stores content in its cache of size
MB bits without knowledge of later demands, where M ∈ [0,N]. We denote the content in the
cache of user k ∈ [K] by Zk, which contains two parts
Zk = (M (Ck), Ck), (1)
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where Ck represents cached content from the N files,
Ck = φk(F1, . . . , FN ,M (Ck)), (2)
and M (Ck) represents the metadata/composition of Ck (i.e., from which code on which bits, Ck
are generated). For any bit in Ck, the metadata of this bit does not reveal which of the other users
cache it. Notice that M (C1), . . . ,M (CK) are random variables over C1, . . . , CK, representing all
types of cache placement which can be used by the K users. In addition, for any k ∈ [K], the
realization of M (Ck) is known by user k and is not known by other users.
We assume that the total length of M (Ck) compared to the file length B such that, for
simplicity, the relevant cache size constraint is
H(Zk)
B
=
H(Ck)
B
≤ M, ∀k ∈ [K]. (Memory size) (3)
We also denote by Z := (Z1, . . . , ZK) the content of all K caches.
Delivery Phase. During the delivery phase, each user demands L files, where L ∈ [N]. In
this paper, we consider N ≥ L to ensure each user has L demands. The demand vector of user
k ∈ [K] are denoted by dk := (dk,1, dk,2, . . . , dk,L), where 1 ≤ dk,1 < dk,2 < · · · < dk,L ≤ N. The
demand matrix of all K users is denoted by D := [d1;d2; . . . ;dK]. In addition, we define D\{k}
for each k ∈ [K] as the demand vectors of all users except user k, where
D\{k} := [d1; . . . ;dk−1,dk+1, . . . ,dK]. (4)
We also denote the set of all possible demand matrices by
D := {D : 1 ≤ dk,1 < dk,2 < · · · < dk,L ≤ N,∀k ∈ [K]}. (5)
We assume that the metadatas of users’ caches, users’ demands, and the library contents are
independent,
H
(
F1, F2, . . . , FN, {M (Ck) : k ∈ [K]}, {TS : S ⊆ [K]},D
)
= NB+H({M (Ck) : k ∈ [K]}) +
∑
S⊆[K]
H(TS) +H(D). (6)
Given the demand matrix D and the users’ caches Z, the server broadcasts a packet X =
(M (P ), P ) which includes three parts (Header, Metadata, and Payload) as illustrated in Fig. 1.
The header of X provides information (e.g., protocols, source, destination, etc.) to ensure that
all users in [K] can receive successfully the broadcasted packet X . To ensure the successful
decoding on the payload, the metadata M (P ) represents the composition of the payload P .
11
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Figure 1: The delivery packet of XS , where ‘H’ represents Header, ‘M’ represents Metadata, ‘P’ represents
Payload.
Notice that M (P ) is random variable over P , representing all types of transmissions by the
server. The payload contains the coded packets from the N files,
P = ψ
(
F1, . . . , FN,M (P )
)
. (7)
We also assume that the total length of the header and metadata are negligible compared to the
payload, such that we have
R := H(X)/B = H(P )/B, (8)
where R represents the load (i.e., normalized number of total transmitted bits) of X .
The constraints on the decoding of the demanded file by each user while maintaining the
privacy is given as follows. For each user k ∈ [K], it must hold that
H({Fi : i ∈ dk}|X,Zk,dk) = 0, ∀k ∈ [K]. (Decodability) (9)
In addition, given dk, user k cannot get any information about the demands of other users from
X , i.e., the information-theoretic privacy constraint is
I(D\{k};X,Zk|dk) = 0, ∀k ∈ [K]. (Privacy) (10)
In other words, the mutual information between D\{k} and the user information after the delivery
phase, quantifies in precise information-theoretic terms the information leakage of the delivery
phase on the demands of other users in the perspective of user k. The privacy constraint
in (10) (zero information leakage) corresponds to perfect secrecy in an information-theoretic
sense (see [32, Chapter 22]).
Since Zk is independent of D, the privacy constraint in (10) can be also written as
I(D\{k};X|Zk,dk) = 0, ∀k ∈ [K]. (Privacy) (11)
Objective. By the constraint of privacy, we can see that the transmitted loads for different
demand matrices should be the same; otherwise, the transmitted load which can be counted by
each user will reveal information about the users demands. The memory-load tradeoff (M,R) is
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said to be achievable for the memory constraint M, if there exist a two-phase private caching
scheme as defined above such that all possible demand matrices can be delivered with load at
most R while the decodability and privacy constraints in (9) and (11) are satisfied. The objective
is to determine, for a fixed M ∈ [0,N], the minimum load R?.
Notice that in the rest of the paper, when we introduce achievable schemes, we directly provide
the construction of the payloads and skip the description on their metadatas.
B. MAN Coded Caching Scheme
In the following, we recall the MAN shared-link caching scheme proposed in [2] and show
this scheme cannot preserve the privacy of the users demands. We first focus on L = 1, i.e.,
each user requests one file.
Placement Phase. Let M = Nt′/K where t′ ∈ [0 : K]. Each file Fi where i ∈ [N] is divide into(
K
t′
)
non-overlapping and equal-length subfiles, Fi = {Fi,W : W ⊆ [K], |W| = t′}, while each
user k ∈ [K] caches Fi,W where k ∈ W . In other words,
Ck = {Fi,W : i ∈ [N],W ⊆ [K], |W| = t′, k ∈ W},∀k ∈ [K]. (12)
Hence, each user caches NB(
K−1
t′−1)
(Kt′)
= MB bits.
Delivery Phase. For each S ⊆ [K] where |S| = t′+1, the server generates an MAN multicast
message
XS = ⊕
k∈S
Fdk,1,S\{k}. (13)
The server transmits X =
(
XS : S ⊆ [K], |S| = t′+1). In this paper, we define the composition
of an XOR message of subfiles (or MDS coded symbols) as the containing subfiles (or MDS
coded symbols) in this message. It can be seen that in the composition of XS , each user in S
caches all subfiles except Fdk,1,S\{k} such that it can recover Fdk,1,S\{k}. Considering all S ⊆ [K]
where |S| = t′ + 1, each user can recover its desired file, i.e., the decodability constraint in (9)
is satisfied.
When L > 1, the transmission is divided into L rounds, where in each round we serve one
demand of each user. By using the above MAN delivery scheme by L times, the achieved load
by the L-round MAN coded caching scheme is as follows,
(MMAN,RMAN) =
(
Nt′
K
, L
K− t′
t′ + 1
)
, ∀t′ ∈ [0 : N]. (14)
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For other memory sizes, we can take the lower convex envelope of the corner points in (14).
However, consider one S ⊆ [K] where |S| = t′ + 1, each user knows the metadata of each
subfile in XS . Hence, it knows the composition of XS , i.e, it knows the union set of the demanded
files by users in S is ∪k∈S{dk,1}, which contradicts the privacy constraint in (11). Even if we
hide the identity of the intended users of each multicast messages (i.e., each user k ∈ S does not
know that XS is useful to users in S \{k}), the composition of the set of all multicast messages
is not symmetric over all the N files if the number of users demanding each file is not the same.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we list the proposed results of this paper for the considered problem described
in Section II-A, and then provide some numerical evaluations.
We first provide a baseline scheme, which trivially uses uncoded caching to let each user
recover the whole library.
Theorem 1 (Baseline Scheme). For the (K,N,M) shared-link caching system with private
demands, R? is upper bounded by
R? ≤ Rbase = N−M. (15)

Proof: Placement Phase. Each user caches the same MB/N bits of each file Fi where
i ∈ [N]. We denote the cached part of Fi by F ci and the uncached part by F ui . Since users have
the same cached content, each user knows the cached content of other users.
Delivery Phase. The server transmits X = {F ui : i ∈ [N]}. For the decodability, each user
has received uncached part of each file in the library, which includes its desired files. For the
privacy, since we transmit the the uncached parts of all files, each user cannot know which files
among them are desired by other users. Hence, the privacy of the users demands is preserved.
Performance. The normalized length of the uncached part of each file is 1 − M
N
. Hence, the
achieved load is N
(
1− M
N
)
= N−M as in Theorem 1.
In order to use the coded caching strategy while preserving the privacy of the users’ demands,
we aim to design private caching schemes such that the composition of the set of all multicast
messages is symmetric over all the N files from the viewpoint of each user. For this purpose, with
a novel idea of private placement precoding summarized in Remark 2 (which makes the cached
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(resp. uncached) bits from each file equivalent from the viewpoint of each user), we propose two
private caching schemes, the virtual-user scheme and the MDS-based scheme scheme, based on
two different strategies, respectively. The main ingredients of the two schemes are as follows.
1) Virtual-user scheme. Since in the library there are N files while each user demands L among
them (i.e., the demand set of each user contains L files), it can be seen that there are totally(
N
L
)
possibilities of demand sets, each of which is requested by at most K users. Hence, we
can generate
(
N
L
)
K − K virtual users such that the system contains totally (N
L
)
K effective
users (i.e., real or virtual users) and each possible demand set is requested by exactly K
effective users. We then use the MAN delivery scheme over these
(
N
L
)
K effective users.
To conclude, the strategy is that even if the composition of each multicast message
is not symmetric over all the N files, with the fact that the number of effective users
demanding each file is identical, we let the composition of the set of all multicast
messages be symmetric over all the N files from the viewpoint of each user.
2) MDS-based scheme. Different from the first strategy, the second strategy is letting
each multicast message be symmetric over all the N files from the viewpoint of
each user. More precisely, with a novel private MDS-coded cache placement, we generate
symmetric multicast messages in the delivery phase, such that each multicast message
(assumed to be useful to users in S) contains one MDS-coded symbol from each file,
where each user k ∈ S caches all MDS-coded symbols from the files which it does not
require. As a result, the composition of the multicast messages is equivalent for different
demands from the viewpoint of each user. With some careful design, there is no MDS-
coded symbol appearing in two multicast messages, which makes the composition of the
set of all multicast messages also symmetric over all the N files.
The achieved load of the virtual user scheme is given in the following, whose proof could be
found in Section IV-A.
Theorem 2 (Virtual-user scheme). For the (K,N,M, L) shared-link caching system with private
demands, R? is upper bounded by Rv, where the memory-load tradeoff (M,Rv) is the lower
convex envelope of (0,N) and the following memory-load pairs(
t(
N
L
)
K
N, L
(
N
L
)
K− t
t+ 1
)
, ∀t ∈
[(
N
L
)
K
]
. (16)

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Notice that the idea to introduce virtual user to hide the demands of the real users was
originally proposed in [22]. [22] focuses on the case of single request (i.e., L = 1) and generates
an arbitrary number of virtual users each of whom randomly demands one file, which cannot
guarantee the information-theoretic privacy constraint in (10) even if the number of virtual users
goes to infinity. Instead, we propose rigorous code constructions on novel private placement
and delivery phases, such that the information-theoretic privacy constraint in (10) holds. In the
proposed virtual-user scheme we introduce a finite and fixed number of virtual users which
depends on the system parameters, and a determinate scenario to choose one demand set for
each virtual user.
Compared to the existing converse bound in [4], [5], [8] for the shared-link caching model
without privacy, we have the following order optimality results of the virtual-user scheme which
will be proved in Appendix A-A.
Theorem 3 (Order Optimality). For the (K,N,M, L) shared-link caching system with private
demands,
• if L = 1, the virtual-user scheme in Theorem 2 is order optimal within a factor of 8 when
N ≤ K, and of 4 when N > K and M ≥ N/K;
• if L > 1, the virtual-user scheme in Theorem 2 is order optimal within a factor of 22 when
N ≤ LK, or when N > LK and M ≥ N/K.

Intuitively, the order optimality results arise from the fact that introducing virtual users does
not increase much load when the memory size is not small (a similar observation was originally
pointed out in [22]).
The virtual-user scheme in Theorem 2 contains
(
N
L
)
K effective users, and generate a subfile of
each file which is then cached by effective users in S for each S ⊆ [K] where |S| = t. Hence,
the needed sub-packetization level is((N
L
)
K
t
)
≈ 2(NL)KH(M/N)
where H(p) = −p log2(p) − (1 − p) log2(1 − p) is the binary entropy function. Hence, the
maximal sub-packetization level of the virtual-user scheme (when M/N ≈ 1/2) is exponential
to
(
N
L
)
K (i.e., O
(
2(
N
L)K
)
), which is much higher than the maximal sub-packetization level of the
K-user MAN coded caching scheme without virtual users (exponential to K, i.e., O (2K)). To
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enable the application of the private caching scheme in the practice, it is important to reduce the
sub-packetization level (at least the maximal sub-packetization level should not be exponentially
larger than the original MAN coded caching scheme). Hence, we propose the MDS-based scheme
with sub-packetization level O (2K). The detailed description of the MDS-based scheme and the
proof of its achieved load can be found in Sections IV-B and IV-C.
Theorem 4 (MDS-based scheme). For the (K,N,M, L) shared-link caching system with private
demands, R? is upper bounded by Rm, where the memory-load tradeoff (M,Rm) is the lower
convex envelope of (0,N), and the following memory-load pairs(
N
2K−1
2K−1 +
(
K−1
t
)
+
(
K−1
t+1
)
+ · · ·+ (K−1
K−1
) , L 2K − (K0)− (K1)− · · · − (Kt)
2K−1 +
(
K−1
t
)
+
(
K−1
t+1
)
+ · · ·+ (K−1
K−1
)) , ∀t ∈ [0 : K],
(17)
and
(
2K− 1
2K
N,
L
2K
)
. (18)

Compared to the existing converse bound in [4], [5], [8] for the shared-link caching model
without privacy, the virtual-user scheme and the MDS-based scheme have the same order
optimality results when M ≥ N/2, which will be proved in Appendix A-B.
Theorem 5 (Order Optimality). For the (K,N,M, L) shared-link caching system with private
demands, when M ≥ N/2, both of Rv and Rm are order optimal within a factor of 2. 
By comparing the achievable bounds in (17) (letting t = K− 1) and (18), with the converse
bound for the MAN shared-link caching model with multiple requests in [33, Theorem 1] (letting
s = 1), we have the following exact optimality result.
Theorem 6 (Exact Optimality). For the (K,N,M, L) shared-link caching system with private
demands where M ≥ min
{
2K−1
2K
, 2
K−1
2K−1+1
}
N, we have
R? = Rm = L
(
1− M
N
)
. (19)

It can be seen that for the considered large memory size regime in Theorem 6, our proposed
schemes can maintain the exact optimality for the shared-link caching model with multiple
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Figure 2: (M,R) tradeoff for the (K,N,M, L) shared-link caching system with private demands.
requests, while preserving the privacy of the users demands. Notice that for this purpose, the
virtual-user scheme needs the memory size no less than (
N
L)K−1
(NL)K
N.
From Theorems 3 and 5, the only open case, where the multiplicative gaps between the
proposed schemes and the existing converse bounds for the shared-link caching model without
privacy constraint are not constant, is when N < LK and M < N/K.
Finally, we provide numerical evaluations of the proposed private caching schemes for the
(K,N,M, L) shared-link caching system with private demands. In Fig. 2 we let L = 1 and use
the converse bound in [4] for the shared-link caching model with single request, as the converse
bound in our problem. In Fig. 2a, we let (K,N) = (10, 20) and in Fig. 2b we let (K,N) = (10, 5).
Both of the figures show that the virtual-user scheme and the MDS-based scheme outperform
the baseline scheme. When M < N/2, it can be seen that the achieved load by the virtual-user
scheme is lower than the MDS-based scheme. In addition, when M ≥ N/2, the achieved loads
by the virtual-user scheme and the MDS-based scheme are close; in this regime, none of them
always has the lower load than the other.
IV. CODED CACHING WITH PRIVATE DEMANDS
A. Proof of Theorem 2
In the following, we describe the virtual-user scheme which achieves the memory-load tradeoff
in (16). We focus on one t ∈ [(N
L
)
K
]
. We define that U :=
(
N
L
)
K.
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Placement Phase. Each file Fi where i ∈ [N] is divided into
(
U
t
)
non-overlapping and equal-
length pieces, denoted by Si1, . . . , S
i
(Ut)
, where each piece has B
(Ut)
bits. We randomly generate a
permutation of
(
U
t
)
, denoted by pi = (pi,1, . . . , pi,(Ut)), independently and uniformly over the set
of all possible permutations. We sort all sets W ⊆ [U] where |W| = t, in a lexicographic order,
denoted by W(1), . . . ,W ((U
t
))
. For each j ∈ [(U
t
)]
, we generate a subfile
fi,W(j) = Sipi,j . (20)
Each user k ∈ [K] caches fi,W where W ⊆ [U], |W| = t, and k ∈ W . Hence, each user caches(
U−1
t−1
)
subfiles of each file, and thus it totally caches (
U−1
t−1)
(Ut)
NB = t
U
NB = MB bits, satisfying the
memory size constraint in (16).
For each subfile of Fi cached by user k ∈ [K], since the random permutation pi is unknown
to user k, it does not know the other users who also cache it. Hence, each cached subfile of
Fi is equivalent from the viewpoint of user k. Similarly, each uncached subfile of Fi is also
equivalent from the viewpoint of user k. Hence, from the viewpoint of user k ∈ [K], each cached
subfile of Fi is equivalent from the viewpoint of user k, while each uncached subfile of Fi is
also equivalent.
Delivery Phase for D. Recall that for one possible demand vector by one user d := (d1, d2, . . . , dL),
we should have 1 ≤ d1 < d2 < · · · < dL ≤ N. Hence, there are totally
(
N
L
)
possible demand
vectors, denoted by d1, . . . ,d(
N
L). We define that
nj := |{k ∈ [K] : dk = dj}| (21)
where j ∈ [(N
L
)]
, representing the number of real users demanding the demand vector dj .
We then allocate one demand vector to each of the U − K virtual users as follows. For each
j ∈ [(N
L
)]
, we let d1+jK−∑q∈[j−1] nq = · · · = d(j+1)K−∑q∈[j] nq = dj . For example, when j = 1,
we let dK+1 = · · · = d2K−n1 = d1; when j = 2, we let d2K−n1+1 = · · · = d3K−n1−n2 = d2.
Hence, by this way, each possible demand vector is requested by K effective (real or virtual)
users.
Recall for any k ∈ [U], we define dk = (dk,1, . . . , dk,L). In addition, we define Ga×b as the
a× b parity-check matrix of the [b, b− a, a + 1] MDS code (or an a× n Cauchy matrix) such
that each a columns are linearly independent (see [34]). For each set S ⊆ [U] where |S| = t+1,
we generate
XS = GL×L(t+1) [fk1,S\{k1}; fk2,S\{k2}; . . . ; fkt+1,S\{kt+1}]. (22)
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containing L combinations where (k1, . . . , kt+1) is a random permutation of S independently and
uniformly over the set of all possible permutations, and we define
fkj ,S\{kj} := [fdkj,1,S\{kj}; fdkj,2,S\{kj}; . . . ; fdkj,L,S\{kj}], ∀j ∈ [t+ 1]. (23)
Finally, we randomly generate a permutation of
[(
U
t+1
)]
, denoted by q = (q1, . . . , q( Ut+1)),
independently and uniformly over the set of all possible permutations. We sort all sets S ⊆ [U]
where |S| = t+1, in a lexicographic order, denoted by S(1), . . . ,S (( U
t+1
))
. The server transmit
X =
XS(q1), . . . , XS(q
( Ut+1)
)
 . (24)
Decodability. We focus on user k ∈ [K]. From the metadata in X (i.e., M (P )), for each
j ∈ [( U
t+1
)]
, user k ∈ [K] checks XS(qj). If XS(qj) contains Lt cached subfiles from the files not
requested by user k, and L subfiles from the files requested by user k, user k knows XS(qj) is
useful to it and then decodes the L requested subfiles from the L linear combinations in XS(qj),
because any L columns in GL×L(t+1) are linearly independent.
After considering all transmitted packets in X , user k ∈ [K] can recover all requested subfiles
to reconstruct its requested files.
Privacy. By the symmetric construction, from the viewpoint of each user k ∈ [K], for any
demand matrix where user k demands dk, there are always K effective users demanding each
possible demand vector. In addition, since the placement permutations (i.e., pi where i ∈ [N]) is
unknown to user k, the cached content of each of the other U− 1 effective users is equivalent
from the viewpoint of user k. Hence, the composition of X is totally equivalent for different
demand matrices from the viewpoint of each user k ∈ [K]. In other words, given dk and Zk, it
can be seen that X is independent of D. Thus the proposed scheme is information-theoretically
private.
Performance. For any demand matrix, we transmit
(
U
t+1
)
messages, each of which contains
LB
(Ut)
bits. Hence, the achieved load is L(
U
t+1)
(Ut)
= LU−t
t+1
, as shown in (16). The sub-packetization
level is
(
U
t
)
.
B. Proof of (17)
In the following we introduce the MDS-based scheme to achieve (17). We first use a more
complicated example than the toy example in Section I-C to highlight more insights.
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Example 1 (K = 3, N = 6, M = 3, L = 2). Consider a (K,N,M, L) = (3, 6, 3, 2) shared-link
caching problem with private demands.
Placement Phase. From (17), we can compute t = 0 in this example. Each file Fi where
i ∈ [N] is divided into (K
0
)
+ · · · + (K
K
)
= 2K = 8 non-overlapping and equal-length pieces,
denoted by Si1, . . . , S
i
2K
, each of which contains B
8
bits. In this example where t = 0, we do not
need the MDS precoding in the placement, which is necessary for t > 1 and will be clarified in
the next example. We randomly generate a permutation of
[
2K
]
, denoted by pi = (pi,1, . . . , pi,2K),
independently and uniformly over the set of all possible permutations. We then assign each piece
to a subfile according to pi as follows,
fi,∅ = Sipi,1 , fi,{1} = S
i
pi,2
, fi,{1,2} = Sipi,3 , fi,{1,2,3} = S
i
pi,4
,
fi,{1,3} = Sipi,5 , fi,{2} = S
i
pi,6
, fi,{2,3} = Sipi,7 , fi,{3} = S
i
pi,8
. (25)
Each user k ∈ [K] caches fi,W if k ∈ W , i.e., the cached contents of the three users for each
file Fi are as follows:
• User 1 stores fi,{1}, fi,{1,2}, fi,{1,3}, and fi,{1,2,3}.
• User 2 stores fi,{2}, fi,{1,2}, fi,{2,3}, and fi,{1,2,3}.
• User 3 stores fi,{3}, fi,{1,3}, fi,{2,3}, and fi,{1,2,3}.
In addition, for each subfile of Fi cached by user k ∈ [K], since the random permutation pi is
unknown to user k, it does not know the other users who also cache it. Hence, each cached
subfile of Fi is equivalent from the viewpoint of user k. Similarly, each uncached subfile of Fi
is also equivalent from the viewpoint of user k.
Since each user caches 4 subfiles (each of which has B/8 bits) for each file in its cache, it
totally caches N4B
8
= 3B = MB bits satisfying the memory size constraint.
For the delivery phase, we do not consider all possible non-equivalent demand configurations,
for the sake of brevity. Instead, we give two explicit examples of the construction of the delivery
phase and then extract some general properties that demonstrate the privacy.
Delivery Phase for D = [1, 2; 3, 4; 5, 6]. For this demand matrix, user 1 demands F1 and F2,
user 2 demands F3 and F4, and user 3 demands F5 and F6. For each file Fi where i ∈ [N], we
define
Qi := {k ∈ [K] : i ∈ dk}, (26)
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as the set of users demanding Fi. For D = [1, 2; 3, 4; 5, 6], we have Q1 = Q2 = {1}, Q3 = Q4 =
{2}, and Q5 = Q6 = {3}.
For each subset S ⊆ [K] where |S| ≥ t+ 1 = 1, we generate a multicast message XS which
is useful to the users S. Our purpose is to let XS be L = 2 linear combinations of N subfiles,
where each file has one subfile in XS and each user in S caches N − L subfiles from the files
which it does not request. In addition, the L = 2 linear combinations are generated by GL×N
where each L columns are linearly independent, such that each user in S can recover the L
uncached subfiles. For each file Fi where i ∈ [N], the subfile of Fi in XS is fi,S∪Qi\(S∩Qi) (the
motivation of this construction will be explained in Remark 1), which is cached by each user in
S not requesting Fi, and not cached by each user in S requesting Fi.
We first consider S = {1}, which only contains one user. We have
X{1} = G2×6 [f1,∅; f2,∅; f3,{1,2}; f4,{1,2}; f5,{1,3}; f6,{1,3}]. (27)
From X{1}, user 1 caches all except f1,∅ and f2,∅, such that it can recover those two subfiles in
X{1} (recall each two columns of G2×6 are linearly independent). Similarly, we have
X{2} = G2×6 [f1,{1,2}; f2,{1,2}; f3,∅; f4,∅; f5,{2,3}; f6,{2,3}], (28)
X{3} = G2×6 [f1,{1,3}; f2,{1,3}; f3,{2,3}; f4,{2,3}; f5,∅; f6,∅]. (29)
We then consider S = {1, 2}, which contains two users. We have
X{1,2} = G2×6 [f1,{2}; f2,{2}; f3,{1}; f4,{1}; f5,{1,2,3}; f6,{1,2,3}]. (30)
From X{1,2}, user 1 caches all except f1,{2} and f2,{2}, such that it can recover those two subfiles
in X{1,2}. In addition, user 2 can recover f3,{1} and f4,{1} from X{1,2}. Similarly, we have
X{1,3} = G2×6 [f1,{3}; f2,{3}; f3,{1,2,3}; f4,{1,2,3}; f5,{1}; f6,{1}], (31)
X{2,3} = G2×6 [f1,{1,2,3}; f2,{1,2,3}; f3,{3}; f4,{3}; f5,{2}; f6,{2}]. (32)
Finally we consider S = {1, 2, 3}, which contains three users. We have
X{1,2,3} = G2×6 [f1,{2,3}; f2,{2,3}; f3,{1,3}; f4,{1,3}; f5,{2,3}; f6,{2,3}]. (33)
From X{1,2,3}, user 1 caches all except f1,{2,3} and f2,{2,3}, such that it can recover those two
subfiles in X{1,2,3}. In addition, user 2 can recover f3,{1,3} and f4,{1,3} while user 3 can recover
f5,{1,2} and f6,{1,2}.
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Hence, the server transmits X = (XS : S ⊆ [K], |S| ∈ [3]), such that each user can recover
its desired files in the delivery phase. For the privacy constraint in (11), we let then focus on
the demand matrix D = [1, 2; 1, 3; 1, 4], and show the compositions of the received multicast
messages by each user are equivalent from its viewpoint to the ones for the demand matrix
D = [1, 2; 3, 4; 5, 6].
Delivery Phase for D = [1, 2; 1, 3; 1, 4]. For D = [1, 2; 1, 3; 1, 4], we have Q1 = {1, 2, 3},
Q2 = {1}, Q3 = {2}, Q4 = {3}, and Q5 = Q6 = ∅. From the same way to construct multicast
messages as described above, for D = [1, 2; 1, 3; 1, 4] we have
X{1} = G2×6 [f1,{2,3}; f2,∅; f3,{1,2}; f4,{1,3}; f5,{1}; f6,{1}], (34)
X{2} = G2×6 [f1,{1,3}; f2,{1,2}; f3,∅; f4,{2,3}; f5,{2}; f6,{2}], (35)
X{3} = G2×6 [f1,{1,2}; f2,{1,3}; f3,{2,3}; f4,∅; f5,{3}; f6,{3}], (36)
X{1,2} = G2×6 [f1,{3}; f2,{2}; f3,{1}; f4,{1,2,3}; f5,{1,2}; f6,{1,2}], (37)
X{1,3} = G2×6 [f1,{2}; f2,{3}; f3,{1,2,3}; f4,{1}; f5,{1,3}; f6,{1,3}], (38)
X{2,3} = G2×6 [f1,{1}; f2,{1,2,3}; f3,{3}; f4,{2}; f5,{2,3}; f6,{2,3}], (39)
X{1,2,3} = G2×6 [f1,∅; f2,{2,3}; f3,{1,3}; f4,{1,2}; f5,{1,2,3}; f6,{1,2,3}], (40)
and let the server transmit X = (XS : S ⊆ [K], |S| ∈ [3]).
Privacy. For any demand matrix (we do not list the transmission for all demand matrices for
sake of simplicity), we can summarize four common points:
1) for any i ∈ [N], each subfile of Fi cached by user 1 is equivalent from the viewpoint of
user 1; each subfile of Fi not cached by user 1 is also equivalent from the viewpoint of
user 1;
2) there does not exist any subfile appearing in two multicast messages, which ensures both
the decodability and privacy.
3) in each of X{1}, X{1,2}, X{1,3}, X{1,2,3}, there is exactly one subfile of each file. If this
subfile is from a file requested by user 1, it is uncached by user 1; otherwise, it is cached
by user 1.
4) in each of X{2}, X{3}, X{2,3}, there is exactly one subfile of each file. If this subfile is from
a file requested by user 1, it is cached by user 1; otherwise, it is uncached by user 1.
Hence, from the viewpoint of user 1, the composition of X (i.e., the subfiles in each XOR
multicast message), is symmetric for different demand matrices in which d1 = (1, 2). In other
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words, knowing d1 and Z1, the probability that X is generated for any demand matrix D\{1},
is identical. Similarly, for any user in [K], it cannot get any information about the demands of
other users neither. The formal information-theoretic proof on the privacy constraint in (11) of
the new private caching scheme can be found in Appendix C.
Performance. For any demand matrix, we transmit
(
K
1
)
+ · · · + (K
K
)
= 2K − 1 = 7 multicast
messages, each of which contains L = 2 linear combinations of subfiles. Since each subfile has
B/8 bits, the load in the delivery phase is 14/8 = 1.75 with sub-packetization level 8. The
achieved load by the virtual-user scheme in Theorem 2 is 23/12 ≈ 1.92 with sub-packetization
level 2(
N
L)KH(M/N) ≈ 2.47×1013. Notice that the achieved load by the baseline scheme is N−M =
3. In conclusion, the achieved load by the MDS-based scheme is less than the virtual-user scheme,
and with a much lower sub-packetization level.

Remark 1. Besides the high-level privacy strategy of the MDS-based scheme introduced in
Section III, there is another important construction which makes the MDS-based scheme private.
In the multicast message XS , there is one subfile from each file. The subfile for the file Fi
is fi,S∪Qi\(S∩Qi), instead of fi,S\Qi , such that there does not exist any subfile appearing in two
multicast messages. We assume fi,S\Qi is transmitted in XS . For each demand matrix where
users request different files, one subfile appears in at most two multicast messages, e.g., if F1
is only demanded by user 1, f1,{3} appears in X{3} and X{1,3}. However, if F1 is demanded
by both users 1, 2 and not by user 3, it can be seen that f1,{3} appears in X{1,3}, X{2,3}, and
X{1,2,3}. Hence, the composition of the multicast messages depends on the users’ demands. 
In the following example, we also consider K = 3, N = 6, L = 2, but with M = 24/7 which
leads t = 1 in (17). For t ≥ 1, the new private caching scheme needs an MDS precoding in the
placement phase.
Example 2 (K = 3, N = 6, M = 24/7, L = 2). From (17), we can compute t = 1.
Placement Phase. Each file Fi where i ∈ [N] is divided into 2K−1+
(
K−1
t
)
+· · ·+(K−1
K−1
)
= 7 non-
overlapping and equal-length pieces, which are then encoded by a
(
2K, 2K−1 +
(
K−1
t
)
+ · · ·+ (K−1
K−1
))
=
(8, 7) MDS code (the parameters of the MDS code will be explained later).1 Each MDS coded
symbol has B/7 bits. By the property of the MDS code, any 7 MDS coded symbols can
1When t = 0, it can be seen that 2K−1 +
(
K−1
t
)
+ · · ·+ (K−1
K−1
)
= 2K. So we do not need the MDS precoding.
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reconstruct the whole file. The 8 MDS coded symbols of Fi are denoted by Si1, . . . , S
i
8. The
rest of the placement phase is the same as t = 0 in Example 1. More precisely, we randomly
generate a permutation of
[
2K
]
, denoted by pi = (pi,1, . . . , pi,2K) and assign each MDS coded
symbol to a subfile according to pi as in (25). Each user k ∈ [K] caches fi,W if k ∈ W . Hence,
each user totally caches 4B
7
N = 24B
7
= MB bits satisfying the memory size constraint.
Delivery Phase for D = [1, 2; 3, 4; 5, 6]. For each subset S ⊆ [K] where |S| ≥ t + 1 = 2, we
let the server transmit XS with the same construction in (30)-(33). In other words, compared to
Example 1 with t = 0, we only transmit X{1,2}, X{1,3}, X{2,3}, X{1,2,3}.
From X{1,2}, X{1,3}, X{1,2,3}, user 1 can recover 3 MDS coded symbols for each of its desired
files. Since it caches 2K−1 = 4 MDS coded symbols for each file, it can recover each of its
desired files by the 4 + 3 = 7 MDS coded symbols, and thus it can recover its desired files.
In short, the XS’s where 0 < |S| < t + 1 are not transmitted in the delivery phase and thus
each user cannot recover all subfiles of its desired files. Hence, we need the MDS precoding for
t ≥ 1.
Privacy. By the same reason as Example 1, the new private scheme for t = 1 can also satisfy
the privacy constraint.
Performance. For any demand matrix, we transmit 4 multicast messages, each of which
contains L = 2 linear combinations of subfiles. Since each subfile has B/7 bits, the load in the
delivery phase is 8/7 ≈ 1.14 with sub-packetization level 8. The achieved load by the virtual-user
scheme is 3550/2457 ≈ 1.44 with sub-packetization level 2(NL)KH(M/N) ≈ 2.22 × 1013. Notice
that the load achieved by the baseline scheme is 18/7 ≈ 2.57. As in Example 1, in this example
the MDS-based scheme has a lower load and a much lower sub-packetzation level compared to
the virtual-user scheme. 
We are now ready to generalize Examples 1 and 2. We focus on the memory size
M =
2K−1
2K−1 +
(
K−1
t
)
+
(
K−1
t+1
)
+ · · ·+ (K−1
K−1
)N,
where t ∈ [0 : K− 1]. Notice that if t = K, we have M = N and each user can store the whole
library in its cache, such that the server needs not to transmit any packet in the delivery phase.
Placement Phase. Each file Fi where i ∈ [N] is divided into 2K−1 +
(
K−1
t
)
+ · · ·+ (K−1
K−1
)
non-
overlapping and equal-length pieces, which are then encoded by a
(
2K, 2K−1 +
(
K−1
t
)
+ · · ·+ (K−1
K−1
))
MDS code. Each MDS coded symbol has B
2K−1+(K−1t )+···+(K−1K−1)
bits, and the MDS coded symbols
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of Fi is denoted by Si1, . . . , S
i
2K
. We randomly generate a permutation of
[
2K
]
, denoted by
pi = (pi,1, . . . , pi,2K), independently and uniformly over the set of all possible permutations.
Recall that Pow(a, j) denotes the j th set in the power set of [a] with a lexicographic order. For
each j ∈ [2K], we generate one subfile
fi,Pow(K,j) := S
i
pi,j
. (41)
Any 2K−1+
(
K−1
t
)
+ · · ·+(K−1
K−1
)
subfiles of Fi can reconstruct Fi. For eachW ⊆ [K], user k ∈ [K]
caches fi,W if k ∈ W . It can be seen that each user caches 2K−1 subfiles of each file. Hence,
each user totally caches 2
K−1
2K−1+(K−1t )+···+(K−1K−1)
NB = MB bits in its cache, satisfying the memory
size constraint.
Delivery Phase for D. Recall that Qi where i ∈ [N] denotes the set of users demanding Fi.
For each subset S ⊆ [K] where |S| ≥ t+ 1, the server generates
XS = GL×N [f1,S∪Q1\(S∩Q1); f2,S∪Q2\(S∩Q2); . . . ; fN,S∪QN\(S∩QN)]. (42)
XS contains L linear combinations and in XS , each user k ∈ S caches all subfiles except
fi,S∪Qi\(S∩Qi) where i ∈ dk. By the property of GL×N (each L columns are linearly independent),
user k can recover fi,S∪Qi\(S∩Qi) where i ∈ dk. Then we let the server transmit
X = (XS : S ⊆ [K], |S| ≥ t+ 1). (43)
Decodability. We first introduce the following lemma, which will be proved in Appendix B.
Lemma 1. For any demand matrix D ∈ D , there is no subfile transmitted in more than one
multicast message of the scheme in Section IV-B.
We focus on user k ∈ [K] and file Fi where i ∈ dk. For each subset S ⊆ [K] where |S| ≥ t+1
and k ∈ S , user k can recover one uncached subfile of Fi from the multicast message XS .
Considering all such subsets, user k can recover
(
K−1
t
)
+ · · ·+(K−1
K−1
)
uncached subfiles of Fi. By
Lemma 1, these subfiles are distinct. Hence, user k can totally obtain 2K−1+
(
K−1
t
)
+ · · ·+(K−1
K−1
)
subfiles of Fi from the placement and delivery phases, such that it can recover Fi.
Privacy. Let us focus on user k. Intuitively, for each subfile of Fi cached by user k, since the
random permutation pi is unknown to user k, it does not know the other users who also cache
it, and thus each cached subfile of Fi is equivalent from the viewpoint of user k. Similarly, each
uncached subfile of Fi is equivalent from the viewpoint of user k. In each multicast message
XS where S ⊆ [K] and |S| ≥ t+ 1,
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• when k ∈ S, there is exactly one subfile of each file. If this subfile is from a file requested
by user k, it is uncached by user k; otherwise, it is cached by user k.
• when k /∈ S, there is exactly one subfile of each file. If this subfile is from a file requested
by user k, it is cached by user k; otherwise, it is uncached by user k.
In addition, by Lemma 1, there does not exist any subfile transmitted in more than one multicast
messages. Hence, the compositions of X = (XS : k ∈ S) for different demand matrices in
which dk is the same, are equivalent from the viewpoint of user k.
In Appendix C, we will prove the privacy in a formal information-theoretic way.
Performance. For any demand matrix, we transmit
(
K
t+1
)
+ · · ·+ (K
K
)
multicast messages, each
of which contains L linear combinations of subfiles. Since each subfile has B
2K−1+(K−1t )+···+(K−1K−1)
bits, the achieved load is
L
(
K
t+1
)
+ · · ·+ (K
K
)
2K−1 +
(
K−1
t
)
+ · · ·+ (K−1
K−1
) = L 2K − (K0)− · · · − (Kt)
2K−1 +
(
K−1
t
)
+ · · ·+ (K−1
K−1
) ,
as in (17). The sub-packetzation level is 2K.
Remark 2. It can be seen that in both of the above proposed schemes in Sections IV-A and IV-B,
the placement precoding which leads that from the viewpoint of one user each cached subfile
of one file is equivalent while each uncached subfile of one file is also equivalent, is the key to
preserve the privacy of the demands of other users from this user. We refer this precoding as to
Private Placement Precoding, which can be generalized as follows.
We focus on a caching placement with a (n, k) MDS precoding where n ≥ k. Each file Fi
is divided into k non-overlapping and equal-length pieces, which are then encoded by a (n, k)
MDS code. The MDS coded symbols of Fi is denoted by Si1, . . . , S
i
n, each of which contains B/k
bits. We randomly generate a permutation of [n], denoted by pi = (pi,1, . . . , pi,n), independently
and uniformly over the set of all possible permutations. For each j ∈ [n], we generate one
subfile of each file Fi,
fi,Wj := S
i
pi,j
, (44)
where Wj ⊆ [K] and we let each user in Wj cache fi,Wj . As a result, from the viewpoint of user
k, each cached subfile of Fi is equivalent from the viewpoint of user k, while each uncached
subfile of Fi is also equivalent. It is obvious that when n = k, the placement is uncoded. Hence,
the proposed private placement precoding can be also used with any uncoded cache placement.
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Even if we use the proposed private precoding for the MAN coded caching scheme described
in Section II-B, the privacy constraint does not hold because the compositions of the MAN
multicast messages are not symmetric for different demand matrices. 
C. Proof of (18)
When M ≥ 2K−1
2K−1+1N, by memory-sharing between the corner points t = K − 1 and t = K
in (17), the MDS-based scheme in Section IV-C achieves the load L
(
1− M
N
)
, which coincides
the converse bound for the MAN caching model with multiple request in [33].
In the following, we will introduce another private caching scheme for M = 2K−1
2K
N. By
memory-sharing between the corner points M = 2K−1
2K
N and M2 = N, for any M1 ≥ 2K−12K N, the
load L
(
1− M1
N
)
is achievable. Hence, if 2K−1
2K
N ≤ 2K−1
2K−1+1N (i.e., K ≥ 4), we can replace the
corner point in (17) with t = K− 1 by the corner point in (18).
Placement Phase. Each file Fi where i ∈ [N] is divided into
(
K
K−1
)
+ K
(
K
K
)
= 2K non-
overlapping and equal-length pieces, denoted by Si1, . . . , S
i
2K, where each piece has
B
2K
bits. We
randomly generate a permutation of [2K], denoted by pi = (pi,1, . . . , pi,2K), independently and
uniformly over the set of all possible permutations. For each k ∈ [K], we generate one subfile
fi,[K]\{k} = Sipi,k . In addition, for each q ∈ [K], we also generate one subfile fi,[K],q = Sipi,K+q .
Each user k ∈ [K] caches fi,W where W ⊆ [K] and |W| = K − 1, if k ∈ W . User k also
caches fi,[K],q for each q ∈ [K]. Hence, each user totally caches (
K−1
K−2)+K(
K−1
K−1)
2K
NB = MB bits in
its cache, satisfying the memory size constraint.
Delivery Phase for D. Notice that each user caches 2K − 1 subfiles of each file, and thus it
needs to recover one subfile of each of its desired files.
In the delivery phase, only one multicast message is generated and transmitted by the server,
X = GL×KN gD. (45)
gD is a vector containing KN pieces. Define gD(j) as the j th piece of gD, where j ∈ [KN]. For
each i ∈ [N] and each k ∈ [K],
• if i ∈ dk (i.e., user k demands Fi), we let gD
(
(i− 1)K+ k) = fi,[K]\{k};
• otherwise, we let gD
(
(i− 1)K+ k) = fi,[K],k.
Decodability. Among the KN subfiles in X , each user k ∈ [K] caches all except fi,[K]\{k}
where i ∈ dk. By the property of GL×KN (each L columns are linearly independent), user k can
recover these L subfiles. Hence, we prove the decodability.
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Privacy. Let us focus on user k. Intuitively, for any demand matrix, there are exactly K subfiles
of each file in P[K]. Among the K subfiles of each file demanded by user k, user k caches K− 1
subfiles, while among the K subfiles of each file not demanded by user k, user k caches K
subfiles. In addition, for any i ∈ [N], each subfile of Fi cached by user k is equivalent from the
viewpoint of user k. Hence, the multicast message X for different demand matrices in which
dk is the same, are equivalent from the viewpoint of user k.
In Appendix D, we will prove the privacy in a formal information-theoretic way.
Performance. For any demand matrix, P[K] contains L linear combinations of subfiles. Since
each subfile has B
2K
bits, the achieved load is L
2K
, as in (18). The sub-packetzation level is 2K.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduced a novel shared-link caching model with private demands, while
the objective is to design a two-phase caching scheme with minimum load while preserving the
privacy of the users demands. We believe that preserving the privacy of the users demands
from other users that legitimately use the caching/content delivery system is an important
problem that differs conceptionally from previously proposed models with eavesdroppers or
private information retrieval (PIR), as shortly outlined in Section I. For the formulated shared-link
caching problem with private demands, we proposed two novel private coded caching schemes,
the virtual-user scheme and the MDS-based scheme, which are information-theoretically private.
Compared to the existing converse bounds for the shared-link caching model without privacy
constraint, the virtual-user scheme is order optimal within a constant factor when N ≤ LK, or
when N < LK and M ≥ N/K. In addition, both of the two schemes are order optimal within a
factor of 2 when M ≥ N/2.
The only open case where the multiplicative gaps between the proposed schemes and the
existing converse bounds for the shared-link caching model without privacy constraint are not
constant is when N < LK and M < N/K. In addition, since the virtual-user scheme has
exponentially high sub-packetization level compared to the original MAN coded caching scheme
and the MDS-based scheme does not have the order optimality results on the achieved load when
M < N/2, the problem of preserving the privacy of the demands in the regime M < N/2 with
order optimal load and small sub-packetization (at least not exponentially larger than the original
MAN coded caching scheme remains open. On-going/future work includes deriving a converse
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bound for this caching model with privacy and designing improved private caching schemes with
small sub-packetization to solve the above two open problems.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF ORDER OPTIMALITY RESULTS
A. Proof of Theorem 3
Converse. We use the existing converse bound in [4], [5], [8] for the shared-link caching model
without privacy, which obviously provides a load lower bound for the shared-link caching model
with private demands. More precisely, we consider L = 1 and L > 1, respectively.
• L = 1. If N ≤ K, the lower convex envelope of (0,N) and (Nt′
K
, K−t
′
t′+1
)
where t′ ∈ [K] is
order optimal within a factor of 4 [5]. If N > K, the lower convex envelope of
(
Nt′
K
, K−t
′
t′+1
)
where t′ ∈ [0 : K] is order optimal within a factor of 2 [4] . In addition, as shown in [3]
that the corner points
(
Nt′
K
, K−t
′
t′+1
)
where t′ ∈ [0 : K] are successively convex. Hence, when
N > K and M ≥ N/K, the lower convex envelop of (Nt′
K
, K−t
′
t′+1
)
, where t′ ∈ [K] is order
optimal within a factor of 2.
• L > 1. The lower convex envelope of (0,N) and
(
Nt′
K
, LK−t
′
t′+1
)
where t′ ∈ [0 : K] is order
optimal within a factor of 11 [8]. If N ≤ LK, the lower convex envelope of (0,N) and(
Nt′
K
, LK−t
′
t′+1
)
where t′ ∈ [K] is order optimal within a factor of 11; if N > LK, the lower
convex envelop of
(
Nt′
K
, LK−t
′
t′+1
)
where t′ ∈ [K], is order optimal within a factor of 2 when
M ≥ N/K.
Achievability. We will prove that from the achieved corner points by the proposed scheme in
Theorem 2,
(
Nt
(NL)K
, L
(NL)K−t
t+1
)
where t ∈ [(N
L
)
K
]
, we can achieve
(
Nt′
K
, 2LK−t
′
t′+1
)
, where t′ ∈ [K].
We now focus on one t′ ∈ [K]. We let t = (N
L
)
t′ and we can achieve
Rv = L
(
N
L
)
K− t
t+ 1
= L
(
N
L
)
K− (N
L
)
t′(
N
L
)
t′ + 1
= L
K− t′
t′ + 1
(NL)
≤ 2(K− t
′)
t′ + 1
, (46)
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where (46) comes from
t′ + 1
t′ + 1
(NL)
≤ t
′ + 1
t′
≤ 2, when t ≥ 1.
Recall that (0,N) can be also achieved by the proposed scheme. Hence, we prove Theorem 3.
B. Proof of Theorem 5
Converse. We use the existing converse bound in [33] for the shared-link caching model
without privacy, which obviously provides a load lower bound for the shared-link caching model
with private demands. From [33, Theorem 1] with s = 1, we have
R? ≥ L
(
1− M
N
)
. (47)
Achievability. When M1 = N/2, from (17) with t = 0 achieved by the improved scheme, we
have
Rm = L
2K − 1
2K
≤ L. (48)
Hence, by memory-sharing between M1 = N/2 with load less than L and M2 = N with load
equal to 0, we have for any M ∈ [N/2,N],
Rm ≤ 2L
(
1− M
N
)
≤ 2R?, (49)
where (49) comes from (47).
Similarly, by letting t =
⌊
(NL)K
2
⌋
in (16), it can be proved that when M1 = N/2, Rv ≤ L.
Hence, Rv is also order optimal within a factor of 2 when M ≥ N/2.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
It is equivalent to prove for any two sets S1 ⊆ [K] and S2 ⊆ [K] where S1 6= S2, we have
(S1 ∪Qi) \ (S1 ∩Qi) 6= (S2 ∪Qi) \ (S2 ∩Qi), ∀i ∈ [N]. (50)
In addition, for each j ∈ [2], we let Sj = Sj,1 ∪ Sj,2 where Sj,1 ⊆ Qi and Sj,2 ∩Qi = ∅.
Without loss of generality, we assume |S1| ≥ |S2|. We focus on two cases:
1) S1,2 6= S2,2. It can be seen that Sj,2 ⊆ ((Sj ∪Qi) \ (Sj ∩Qi)) for each j ∈ [2]. Hence, (50)
holds for this case.
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2) S1,2 = S2,2 and S1,1 6= S2,1. Since |S1| ≥ |S2| and S1,1 6= S2,1, there exists at least one user
in Qi (assume to be k) who is in S1,1 \ S2,1. Hence, this user k is in (S2 ∪Qi) \ (S2 ∩Qi)
but not in (S1 ∪Qi) \ (S1 ∩Qi). Hence, (50) holds for this case.
In conclusion, we prove Lemma 1.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THE PRIVACY FOR THE NEW SCHEME IN (17)
We consider t = 0 in (17). It can be seen when t > 0, the transmitted multicast messages are
included in the the transmitted multicast messages for t = 0. Hence, if we prove the privacy for
t = 0, the privacy for t > 0 can also be proved.
For the new scheme in (17), we want to prove the privacy constraint in (11),
I(D\{k};X|Zk,dk) = 0, ∀k ∈ [K]. (51)
We now focus on one user k, one demand vector dk, and one cache realization zk. Assume
(xS : S ⊆ [K], |S| > 0) is a possible realization of (XS : S ⊆ [K], |S| > 0), given dk and zk.
We want to prove for any demand matrix D\{k}, the probability
Pr{(XS : S ⊆ [K], |S| > 0) = (xS : S ⊆ [K], |S| > 0)|dk, zk,D\{k}}
does not depend on D\{k}.
For each S ⊆ [K] and each i ∈ [N], we denote the coded MDS symbol of Fi in XS by XS,i.
We have
Pr{(XS : S ⊆ [K], |S| > 0) = (xS : S ⊆ [K], |S| > 0)|dk, zk,D\{k}}
= Pr{(XS,i : S ⊆ [K], |S| > 0, i ∈ [N]) = (xS,i : S ⊆ [K], |S| > 0, i ∈ [N])|dk, zk,D\{k}}
=
∏
i∈[N]
Pr{(XS,i : S ⊆ [K], |S| > 0) = (xS,i : S ⊆ [K], |S| > 0)|dk, zk,D\{k}}, (52)
where (52) comes from that the placement permutations p1, . . . ,pN are independent.
We then focus on two cases:
• i ∈ dk. It is claimed in Lemma 1 that there does not exist any subfile appearing two
multicast messages. Given zk, there are 2K−1 MDS coded symbols of Fi not in zk, each of
which should be in one different XS1 where S1 ⊆ [K] and k ∈ S1. In addition, there are
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2K−1 MDS coded symbols of Fi in zk, each of which should be in one different XS2 where
S2 ⊆ [K], k /∈ S2, and |S2| > 0. Hence, we have
Pr
{
(XS,i : S ⊆ [K], |S| > 0) = (xS,i : S ⊆ [K], |S| > 0)
∣∣∣dk, zk,D\{k}} (53a)
= Pr
{
(XS1,i : S1 ⊆ [K], k ∈ S1) = (xS1,i : S1 ⊆ [K], k ∈ S1),
(XS2,i : S2 ⊆ [K], k /∈ S2, |S2| > 0) = (xS2,i : S2 ⊆ [K], k /∈ S2, |S2| > 0)
∣∣∣dk, zk,D\{k}}
(53b)
= Pr
{
(XS1,i : S1 ⊆ [K], k ∈ S1) = (xS1,i : S1 ⊆ [K], k ∈ S1)
∣∣∣dk, zk,D\{k}}
Pr
{
(XS2,i : S2 ⊆ [K], k /∈ S2, |S2| > 0) = (xS2,i : S2 ⊆ [K], k /∈ S2, |S2| > 0)
∣∣∣dk, zk,D\{k}}
(53c)
=
(
1
2K−1!
)2
, (53d)
where ! represents the factorial operation. (53c) comes from that each XS1,i is not cached
by user k and each XS2,i is cached by user k, and thus their realizations are independent
given zk and D.
• i /∈ dk. It is claimed in Lemma 1 that there does not exist any subfile appearing two
multicast messages. Given zk, there are 2K−1 coded MDS symbols of Fi in zk, each of
which should be in one different XS1 where S ⊆ [K] and k ∈ S1. In addition, there are
2K−1 coded MDS symbols of Fi not in zk, each of which should be in one different XS2
where S ⊆ [K], k /∈ S2, and |S2| > 0. Hence, from the same derivation as (53d) we have
Pr{(XS,i : S ⊆ [K], |S| > 0) = (xS,i : S ⊆ [K], |S| > 0)|dk, zk,D\{k}} =
(
1
2K−1!
)2
.
(54)
It can be seen both of the probabilities in (53d) and (54) are independent of D\{k}. Hence, we can
prove the probability in (52) is also independent of D\{k}. In conclusion, we prove the privacy
constraint in (11).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THE PRIVACY FOR THE NEW SCHEME IN (18)
For the new scheme in (18), there is only one multicast message in X . We want to prove the
privacy constraint in (11),
I(D\{k};X|Zk,dk) = 0, ∀k ∈ [K]. (55)
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We also focus on one user k, one demand vector dk, and one cache realization zk. Assume x is
a possible realization of X , given dk and zk. We want to prove for any demand matrix D\{k},
the probability
Pr{X = x|dk, zk,D\{k}}
does not depend on D\{k}.
In X , there are K pieces of each file Fi. Hence, Xi now denotes the set of K pieces of Fi in
X . Since the placement permutations p1, . . . ,pN are independent, we have
Pr{X = x|dk, zk,D\{k}} =
∏
i∈[N]
Pr{Xi = xi|dk, zk,D\{k}}. (56)
We also focus two cases:
• i ∈ dk. Notice that zk contains 2K−1 pieces of Fi while Fi contains 2K pieces. In addition,
in Xi there are K−1 pieces of Fi cached in zk and one piece of Fi not cached in zk. Hence,
we have
Pr{Xi = xi|dk, zk,D\{k}} = 1(2K−1
K−1
) . (57)
• i /∈ dk. In Xi there are K pieces of Fi cached in zk. Hence, we have
Pr{Xi = xi|dk, zk,D\{k}} = 1(2K−1
K
) = 1(
2K−1
K−1
) . (58)
It can be seen both of the probabilities in (57) and (58) are independent of D\{k}. Hence, we can
prove the probability in (56) is also independent of D\{k}. In conclusion, we prove the privacy
constraint in (11).
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